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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Although the practice of shackling an incarcerated pregnant 
female is consistently condemned by both national and international 
public opinion as well as leading medical and public health 
associations, it remains routine practice in the majority of prisons and 
jails throughout the United States.  Further, although some states have 
recently adopted legislation banning such practices, the swarm of 
litigation surrounding the issue of shackling in those states illustrates 
that this treatment is still occurring despite the extraordinary efforts of 
advocates and laws banning the practice.  This paper begins by 
discussing the origins of shackling in order to provide a framework, 
and then presents two individual accounts before offering information 
detailing the serious health risks that shackling imposes upon female 
inmates and their babies.  This paper then dives into analyses of the 
strong legal challenges against the barbaric practice, outlining 
shackling’s clear violations of both constitutional and international 
human rights laws.  Finally, this paper notes the significant progress 
achieved thus far and what needs to be done to achieve complete 
abandonment of the grossly inhumane practice.  
 
II. THE ORIGINS OF SHACKLING 
 
 The origins of shackling can be traced back numerous 
centuries, with the earliest restraint relics dating back to prehistoric 
times, and the earliest references appearing numerous times in the 
Bible.  However, it remains unclear exactly when United States 
detention centers began employing the practice of shackling pregnant 
inmates.  Historians generally cite the 1970s and 1980s as the time 
period when the practice likely became common, as it was during 
these decades that criminal justice facilities adopted gender-neutral 
policies in response to the civil rights and women's rights movements.1  
Thus, those policies resulted in the shackling of most prisoners – 
regardless of gender and condition – who were involved in any 
transport outside of the detention facility. 
 At the time that gender-neutral criminal justice policies were 
adopted, women were underrepresented at all levels of the criminal 
justice system.  “Little or no thought was given to the possibility of a 
                                                 
 
1 Colleen Mastony, Childbirth in Chains, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2010. 
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female prisoner until she appeared at the door of the institution.  It was 
as though crime and punishment existed in a world in which gender 
equaled male.”2  Consequently, prison infrastructures and policies 
were established to handle the prototypical violent male offender, and 
shackling, specifically, was employed for the purposes of decreasing 
flight risk and maintaining the safety of the officers and public against 
the prototypical violent male offender.3 
  
III. TODAY'S SHACKLING EPIDEMIC UPON PREGNANT FEMALE 
INMATES – HOW DID THIS HAPPEN? 
 
The prison and jail populations in the United States have vastly 
diversified since the adoption of gender-neutral policies.  Within the 
last quarter century, the number of women involved in the United 
States’ criminal justice system has skyrocketed.  In fact, United States’ 
prisons and jails now house approximately two hundred thousand 
women.4  Since 1980, the number of women in prison has increased at 
nearly double the rate for men, and more than fifty percent of female 
inmates are under the age of thirty-five.5  Thus, it comes as no surprise 
that the fastest growing prison population in the country consists of 
mothers of young children.6  Further, four percent of women in state 
prisons, three percent of women in federal prisons, and approximately 
five percent of women in jail reported being pregnant at the time of 
their incarceration.7  Accordingly, it is estimated that nearly two 
thousand babies are born to women in prison or jail annually,8 and due 
to the continual increase in female inmates, this figure is on the rise. 
                                                 
 
2 MARC MAUER & MEDA CHESNEY-LIND, eds., INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 181 (2002).   
3 Mastony, supra note 1. 
4 TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2011 – 
STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2012), available at 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim11st.pdf. 
5 B. JAYE ANNO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE: GUIDELINES 
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AN ADEQUATE DELIVERY SYSTEM 233 (2001), available 
at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2001/017521.pdf. 
6 RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER: A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE 
POLITICS IN AMERICA 243 (2005).  
7 LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
SPECIAL REPORT: MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF JAIL INMATES (2006), available at 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpji.pdf. 
8 Ronald L. Braithwaite, Henrie M. Treadwell & Kimberly R.J. Arriola, Health 
Disparities and Incarcerated Women: A Population Ignored, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1679 (2005).  
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 The drastic increase in the number of female inmates has been 
largely attributed to the past quarter-century’s “war on drugs” and the 
implementation of mandatory drug sentencing policies.9  Stephanie R. 
Bush-Baskette, a former member of the New Jersey State Legislature 
and renowned researcher and author of women’s imprisonment issues, 
explained in a recent publication, “Inadvertently, the war on drugs 
became the war on women….”10 Between the years of 1986 and 1996, 
the number of women incarcerated for drug offenses increased by an 
astonishing 888 percent.11  Thus, the United States’ prisons and jails, 
which were designed to house violent male offenders, are now home to 
growing numbers of non-violent female offenders, a situation that the 
original framers of penological policy never anticipated. 
 Despite the extreme number of women entering the United 
States’ criminal justice system, female offenders are much less likely 
to be incarcerated due to violent crimes.  In fact, women only account 
for approximately fourteen percent of all violent offenses.12  Further, 
even when females are convicted of violent crimes, simple assault 
accounts for nearly seventy-five percent of those convictions.13  This 
illustrates that even when women are accountable for violent crime, 
the majority are classified on the lowest end of the violence spectrum, 
as opposed to violent crimes committed by men.    
 As illustrated above, today’s prison and jail population in the 
United States has vastly diversified since the adoption of gender-
neutral policies.  Unfortunately, changes in criminal justice policy 
have failed to keep pace with these changes.  Thus, shackling remains 
in practice, and is, unfortunately, being imposed upon pregnant female 
inmates at alarming rates.  The following accounts of two former 
inmates detail the gruesome experiences that shocking numbers of 
pregnant female inmates have experienced and are continuing to 
experience.  
  
 
                                                 
 
9 LENORA LAPIDUS, ET AL, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CAUGHT IN THE NET: THE 
IMPACT ON DRUG POLICIES ON WOMEN AND FAMILIES 15-16 (2005), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file431_23513.pdf. 
10 Stephanie R. Bush-Baskette, The “War on Drugs”: A War Against Women?, in 
HARSH PUNISHMENT: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN’S IMPRISONMENT 
211, 216-17 (Sandy Cook & Susanne Davids, eds. 1999). 
11 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GENDER-RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, 
AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WOMEN OFFENDERS 74 (2002), available at 
nicic.gov/library/files/018017.pdf. 
12 LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN 
OFFENDERS 1 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wo.pdf. 
13 Id.  
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IV. A CASE TOO CLOSE TO HOME 
 
 Juana Villegas was nine months pregnant when she was 
driving home from a doctor’s appointment with her eleven-year-old 
son, fourteen-year-old son, and two-year-old daughter on July 3, 
2008.14  While travelling through the City of Berry Hill in the greater 
Nashville, Tennessee area, Ms. Villegas was stopped by Officer Tim 
Coleman.15  Without notifying Ms. Villegas of why she had been 
stopped, Officer Coleman asked for Ms. Villegas’ license and 
registration.16  Ms. Villegas failed to produce a valid driver’s license, 
and Officer Coleman instructed Ms. Villegas to call someone with a 
valid driver’s license to retrieve her children and vehicle, and 
immediately placed her under arrest.17  Despite Ms. Villegas’ 
condition and the presence of her children, Officer Coleman ordered 
Ms. Villegas to get into his patrol car under the threat of cuffing her, 
and transported her to a Davidson County pretrial detention center.18  
 Ms. Villegas went into labor while alone in a cell in the 
detention center on the evening of July 5, 2008.19  After complaining 
of severe pain from contractions and pleading with the guard on duty, 
Ms. Villegas was taken to the nurse’s station, where her hands and feet 
were shackled in anticipation of transport.20  Ms. Villegas was then 
transported by ambulance to Nashville General Hospital, where she 
remained shackled.21  Despite medical staff requests, Ms. Villegas was 
forced to change into a hospital gown in the presence of two male 
officers.22  The officers refused to allow Ms. Villegas any privacy 
while changing or during examinations, and prohibited Ms. Villegas 
from contacting her husband to notify him of the impending birth of 
their son.23  Throughout the entirety of the labor process, Ms. Villegas’ 
left foot and right hand were shackled to the hospital bed.24  Despite 
complaints of the hospital staff that such treatment was barbaric and 
                                                 
 
14 Complaint at ¶ 7, Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Davidson Cnty., 789 F. Supp. 2d 895 
(M.D. Tenn. 2011) (No. 09CV00219). 
15 Id. at ¶ 8.  
16 Id. at ¶ 11.  
17 Id. at ¶ 13. 
18 Id. at ¶ 24. 
19 Id. at ¶ 43. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at ¶ 44.  
22 Id. at ¶ 45.  
23 Id. at ¶ 46.  
24 Id. at ¶ 47.  
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dangerous to Ms. Villegas and her child, Ms. Villegas remained 
shackled.25  
 Ms. Villegas gave birth to her son during the early hours of 
July 6, 2008.26  Ms. Villegas was instructed by nurses to walk around 
as much as possible post-delivery in order to encourage muscle 
rehabilitation.27  However, Ms. Villegas was prohibited from doing so 
as her feet remained shackled throughout the entirety of her two-day 
post-partum recovery period, even while bathing and using the toilet.28  
Further, Ms. Villegas was immediately separated from her newborn 
son.29  
A nurse had provided Ms. Villegas with a breast pump and 
moisturizers to enable her to express her breast milk safely and to 
alleviate pain while she was unable to nurse due to the separation from 
her newborn.30  However, the officer accompanying Ms. Villegas 
during transport refused to allow Ms. Villegas to take the materials 
with her despite pleas and medical explanations of the hospital staff.31  
As a result, Ms. Villegas’ breasts became extremely swollen and 
painful, preventing her from moving or sleeping.32  Eventually, Ms. 
Villegas developed mastitis, an infection of the breast tissue caused by 
the inability to express breast milk.33  Further, because Ms. Villegas 
was prohibited from properly exercising her lower body muscles post-
delivery as instructed due to her shackles, Ms. Villegas experienced 
weeks of cramping, stiffness, and leg pain so severe that she could not 
straighten her left leg, which had been shackled to the hospital bed.34 
 Ms. Villegas was not reunited with her newborn son until her 
release from the detention center.35  Subsequent to her release, Ms. 
Villegas went to municipal court to challenge the basis for the stop in 
her case.36  Ultimately, the charge upon which she was stopped was 
dismissed.37  The municipal court ignored the shackling of Ms. 
Villegas, noting that it was acceptable because it was implemented 
pursuant to Davidson County Sherriff’s Office policy despite the fact 
                                                 
 
25 Id. at ¶ 48.  
26 Id. at ¶ 51.  
27 Id. at ¶ 53.  
28 Id. at ¶¶ 53-55. 
29 Id. at ¶ 59.  
30 Id. at ¶ 62. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at ¶ 66.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. at ¶ 67.  
35 Id. at ¶ 68. 
36 Id. at ¶ 73.  
37 Id. 
2014]                               CHILDBIRTH IN CHAINS                                        117  
 
that Ms. Villegas had not had any outstanding criminal charges, arrests 
or warrants, was never violent or uncooperative, and posed no flight 
risk before delivery due to the advanced stage or her pregnancy, or 
after delivery due to her condition.38 
 
V. SHAWANNA NELSON'S NIGHTMARE 
 
 On June 3, 2003, Shawanna Nelson was placed in an Arkansas 
Department of Correction detention facility following convictions for 
credit fraud and writing checks with insufficient funds.39  At the time 
of Ms. Nelson’s entrance into the Arkansas Department of Correction, 
she was six months pregnant with her second child.  On September 20, 
2003, Ms. Nelson went into labor at the detention facility, and was 
sent to the prison infirmary after complaining of severe pain to a 
corrections officer.40  Despite having contractions recurring at six to 
seven minute intervals, the infirmary nurse sent Ms. Nelson back to 
her cell.41  Ms. Nelson returned to the infirmary shortly thereafter, 
barely able to walk down the hall due to the intense pain, but was 
again sent back to her cell as her contractions intensified to five to six 
minute intervals.42  Ultimately, after witnessing the severity of the 
situation and the lack of the infirmary staff’s concern, the correctional 
officer demanded that Ms. Nelson be taken to a hospital and took 
action herself.43 
 Correctional Officer Patricia Turensky escorted Ms. Nelson to 
the hospital.44  Although Officer Turensky stated that she never felt 
threatened by Ms. Nelson at any time, and that Ms. Nelson neither said 
nor did anything to suggest she posed a flight risk, Officer Turensky 
shackled Ms. Nelson’s legs to a wheelchair upon arrival at the 
hospital.45  Upon arriving in the maternity ward, Ms. Nelson changed 
into a hospital gown and was placed on a stretcher.46  At this point, 
Ms. Nelson was in the very final stages of labor, as her cervix had 
dilated to seven centimeters.47  Nonetheless, Officer Turensky 
                                                 
 
38 Id. at ¶ 38. 
39 Elizabeth Alexander, Unshackling Shawanna: The Battle over Chaining Women 
Prisoners During Labor and Delivery, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 435, 441 
(2010). 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 525 (8th Cir. 2009). 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 526. 
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shackled both of Ms. Nelson’s ankles to opposite ends of the hospital 
bed.48 
 Due to the shackles on both of her ankles, Ms. Nelson was 
unable to move her legs, stretch, or change positions to alleviate the 
extreme pain.49  Medical staff pleaded with Officer Turensky to 
remove Ms. Nelson’s restraints, but to no avail.50  Further, because it 
was too close to delivery for the administration of an epidural, Ms. 
Nelson was only given only Tylenol.51  Ms. Nelson gave birth to a 
nearly ten-pound baby boy on September 20, 2003 at 6:23 in the 
evening.52 
 As a direct result of being shackled, Ms. Nelson suffered a hip 
dislocation, torn stomach muscles, and an umbilical hernia during 
labor and delivery.53  During the first night of her post-partum 
recovery in the hospital, Ms. Nelson was prevented from accessing the 
restroom without first being unshackled from her hospital bed.  By the 
time the accompanying officer responded to Ms. Nelson’s pleas and 
unlocked the shackles, Ms. Nelson had been forced to soil herself.54  
 Following Ms. Nelson’s release from the hospital and 
correctional facility, she underwent major surgeries for both the hip 
dislocation and umbilical hernia she suffered due to shackling during 
labor and delivery.55  Ms. Nelson’s hip injury ultimately caused 
permanent deformities to her hips, resulting in permanent inabilities to 
sleep or bear weight on her left side, or to sit or stand for extended 
periods of time.56  Additionally, Ms. Nelson was advised to never have 
any more children due to the permanent damage that shackling 
imposed on her physical health.57  
 
VI. HEALTH IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Leading medical experts throughout the United States and the 
entire world have voiced their clear opposition to the practice of 
shackling pregnant inmates.  The American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, the American Medical Association, and various 
                                                 
 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
53 Id.  
54 Alexander, supra note 39, at 442. 
55 Id. at 443.  
56 Nelson, 583 F.3d at 526. 
57 Id.  
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other experts in fields concerning fetal and maternal health have 
expressed their deep concerns regarding the dangers that shackling 
poses to the physical health of both the mother and child, as well as the 
mental health of the mother.  
 
A. Shackling Imposes an Unacceptable Risk to the 
Physical Health of both the Mother and Child 
 
 The use of shackles on pregnant female inmates poses 
substantial risks to the physical health of both the mother and child.  
First, physical restraints interfere with the ability of health care 
providers to safely perform necessary actions.  Shackles specifically 
inhibit a practitioner from adequately assessing and evaluating the 
health of the mother and fetus, assisting the mother during labor and 
delivery, and conducting emergency procedures if necessary.58  Dr. 
Patricia Garcia, an obstetrician and gynecologist at Northwestern 
University’s Prentice Women’s Hospital, explained, “Having the 
woman in shackles compromises the ability to manipulate her legs into 
the proper positions for necessary treatment.”59  Numerous imperative 
assessments are inhibited by the presence of shackles.  For example, 
tests for conditions such as appendicitis, preterm labor, vaginal 
bleeding, venous thrombosis, and kidney infection all cannot be 
performed upon a shackled patient.60  Further, hypertensive disease, 
which occurs in approximately 12-22% of pregnancies, and is directly 
responsible for approximately 18% of all maternal deaths in the United 
States, cannot be safely treated while a woman is shackled.61  
 Shackles also impose a dangerous burden should complications 
arise.  Dr. Garcia specifically stated that “women in labor need to be 
mobile so that they can assume various positions as needed and so they 
can quickly be moved to an operating room” in case exigent 
complications arise.62  Particular potential emergencies of concern, due 
                                                 
 
58 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, HEALTH CARE FOR 
PREGNANT AND POSTPARTUM INCARCERATED WOMEN AND ADOLESCENT FEMALES, 
2011 Comm. Op. No. 511, at 3 available at 
http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Committee_Opinions/Committee
_on_Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/Health_Care_for_Pregnant_and_Postpa
rtum_Incarcerated_Women_and_Adolescent_Females. 
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 AMNESTY INT’L, “NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE”: VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY (1999), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/019/1999/en/685257e6-e33d-11dd-
808b-bfd8d459a3de/amr510191999en.html. 
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to their common occurrences, include shoulder dystocia, hemorrhage, 
fetal heart rate abnormalities, and the need for an immediate cesarean 
section.63  The dangerous delays that shackling imposes in such cases 
are remarkably hazardous.  Dr. Garcia explained to Amnesty 
International that if the need for an emergency cesarean section were 
to arise, the presence of restraints on the mother could possibly be the 
difference between life and death for the mother or her child: “If there 
were a need for a C-section (caesarian delivery), the mother needs to 
be moved to an operating room immediately and a delay of even five 
minutes could result in permanent brain damage for the baby.”64   
 Second, shackling hampers the mother from shifting positions 
in order to alleviate the extreme pains of labor and childbirth.  Such 
restraint leads to increased stress and desperation, which may decrease 
the amount of oxygen available to the fetus, and often results in severe 
bruising, abrasions, and other injuries to the mother.  Warnice 
Robinson was forced to give birth while shackled in Illinois after a 
conviction for shoplifting.65  Ms. Robinson described her experience 
of giving birth while incarcerated as “one of the most horrifying 
experiences of my life.”66  In an interview with Amnesty International, 
Ms. Robinson continued, “I was shackled to a metal bed post by my 
right ankle throughout seven hours of labor.  Imagine being shackled 
to a metal bedpost, excruciating pains going through my body, and not 
being able to adjust myself to even try to feel any type of comfort, 
trying to move and with each turn having hard, cold metal restraining 
my movements.”67  Samantha Luther was forced to give birth in 
Wisconsin while her ankles were shackled approximately eighteen 
inches apart.68  Ms. Luther was required to pace in order to induce 
                                                 
 
63 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, HEALTH CARE FOR 
PREGNANT AND POSTPARTUM INCARCERATED WOMEN AND ADOLESCENT FEMALES, 
2011 Comm. Op. No. 511, at 3 available at 
http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Committee_Opinions/Committee
_on_Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/Health_Care_for_Pregnant_and_Postpa
rtum_Incarcerated_Women_and_Adolescent_Females. 
64 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
AND SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN (2001), available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/custodyissues.pdf. 
65 AMNESTY INT’L, “NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE”: VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY (March 1999), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/019/1999/en/685257e6-e33d-11dd-
808b-bfd8d459a3de/amr510191999en.html. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 AMNESTY INT’L, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND 
SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN (2001), available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/custodyissues.pdf. 
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birth while shackled, and was so tightly restrained that her shackles 
were only finally removed immediately prior to birth after it was 
determined that she was unable to adequately push.69  Ms. Luther 
recounted that the experience was “so humiliating.  My ankles were 
raw.”70  Shawanna Nelson was forced to endure most of the final 
stages of labor with her legs spread and cuffed to opposite sides of a 
hospital gurney.71  Although her shackles were eventually removed 
after numerous demands by both nurses and physicians, Ms. Nelson 
suffered a permanent hip injury, torn stomach muscles, and an 
umbilical hernia requiring surgical repair as a result of the shackling.72  
Ms. Nelson’s injuries were so extensive that she is now unable to bear 
weight on her left side, sit or stand for extended periods, and has been 
advised not to have any more children.73  Ms. Nelson’s orthopedist 
noted that the shackling caused permanent deformity of Ms. Nelson’s 
hips.74 
 Third, restraints increase the risk of a life threatening injury as 
a result of the mother losing her balance and falling.  Pregnancy, 
especially during the second and third trimesters, is notorious for 
causing balance problems due to the shift of the mother’s center of 
gravity.75  Falling is an extremely common occurrence in pregnant 
women, and is a noted cause of miscarriage, stillbirth, and injury to 
both the mother and the child.  Shackling only exacerbates these 
problems.76  Further, shackling not only heightens the risk of a 
pregnant woman falling, but also then prevents a woman from bracing 
herself during a fall in order to protect herself or her child from 
injury.77   
 Fourth, the use of shackles after delivery prevents mothers 
from effectively healing and caring for the child during the post-
                                                 
 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 525-26 (8th Cir. 2009). 
72 Id. at 526. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 See Julie B. Ehrlich & Lynn M. Paltrow, Jailing Pregnant Women Raises Health 
Risks, WOMEN’S ENEWS, (Sept. 20, 2006), 
http://womensenews.org/story/health/060920/jailing-pregnant-women-raises-health-
risks. 
76 Id. 
77 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, HEALTH CARE FOR 
PREGNANT AND POSTPARTUM INCARCERATED WOMEN AND ADOLESCENT FEMALES, 
2011 Comm. Op. No. 511, at 3 available at 
http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/Committee_Opinions/Committee
_on_Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/Health_Care_for_Pregnant_and_Postpa
rtum_Incarcerated_Women_and_Adolescent_Females. 
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partum recovery period.  Shackling specifically hinders a woman’s 
post-partum recovery.  In order to begin the muscular rehabilitative 
process, it is imperative for a woman to begin walking after delivery.  
Such exercise is either made dangerous or is completely prohibited by 
shackling.  Further, as detailed by the ACLU of Georgia and American 
College of Nurse Midwives, it is critical for a woman to remain 
unshackled postpartum to prevent thromboembolic disease or 
hemorrhaging.78  Elizabeth, a woman who was forced to give birth 
while shackled in Virginia in 2006, was forced to endure all aspects of 
labor, delivery, and postpartum recovery while shackled.79  Further, 
she was taken back to a Virginia Correctional Center after only an 
hour after delivering, and before she had expelled the placenta after 
birth.80  After multiple weeks and while still incarcerated, Elizabeth 
experienced a severely painful hemorrhage and finally expelled the 
placenta that had remained inside of her.81  
 Shackling also hampers imperative mother-child bonding 
practices, which are essential to the healthy development of the child.82  
Dr. Patricia Garcia explained, “The use of restraints creates a 
hazardous situation for the mother and the baby, compromises the 
mother’s ability postpartum to care for her baby, and keeps her from 
being able to breastfeed.”83  Unfortunately, the vast majority of women 
who are forced to endure labor and delivery while shackled not only 
remain shackled through post-partum recovery, but also either never 
get to see their newborn child, or are immediately separated from 
them, thus preventing any chance for mother-child bonding.84  
 
                                                 
 
78 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SHACKLING OF PREGNANT INMATES: PROTECTING 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN PRISONS (2013), available at 
http://www.acluga.org/issues/women-s-rights/shackling-of-pregnant-inmates/. 
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B. Shackling Imposes an Unacceptable Risk to the Mental 
Health of the Mother 
 
 In addition to the extreme physical risks that are imposed upon 
incarcerated mothers and their children by shackling, many women 
face additional mental health issues after being forced through such a 
horrific and humiliating experience.  In its opposition to the practice of 
shackling, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
has asserted that shackling is both unnecessary and demeaning and 
causes severe mental anguish.85  Further, the ACLU has labeled 
shackling as degrading, and continuously voices concerns about 
shackling’s effects on not only the physical welfare, but also the 
mental welfare of its victims.86  
 Melissa Hall, who was arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance, remembers having to appear in court in leg irons, a chain 
belt, and handcuffs, creating a crippling fear of falling and injuring 
herself and her child.87  Further, Ms. Hall was forced to endure more 
than forty-eight hours in labor while shackled with her legs spread in 
stirrups while a male officer was present in her room.88  The officer 
refused to remove the restraints or allow Ms. Hall any privacy, and 
remained in the room watching and cheering during the NBA Finals 
while the baby was crowning.89  Ms. Hall described the experience as 
the worst, most degrading of her life and she now suffers from serious 
depression.90  
 After giving birth to a nearly ten-pound child while shackled, 
Shawanna Nelson endured various severe injuries and now suffers 
from extreme mental distress.91  During the night after giving birth and 
being separated from her newborn child, Ms. Nelson needed to relieve 
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herself in the restroom.92  However, the restriction of the shackles in 
addition to the injuries she sustained during her shackled birth severely 
limited her mobility.93  Thus, Ms. Nelson was unable to wait to use the 
restroom before the accompanying officer unlocked her shackles, and 
was forced to soil herself.94  In Ms. Nelson’s statement in the prison 
grievance system, she described her experience by stating: 
 
I am traumatized by this event, my hip is still very sore, 
and I can only sleep on my back. It is not a day that 
goes by that I don’t wonder why I was treated that way. 
[Officer] Turensky had a gun so, why was I restrained? 
. . . . It is enough to be separated from a newborn baby, 
but to be treated like an animal while giving birth 
totally ruins your whole mental and emotional state of 
mind.95 
 
VII.  CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
 
A. Shackling Constitutes an Unconstitutional Violation of 
the Eighth Amendment 
 
 “Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates 
from the protections of the Constitution.”96  In contrast, inmates 
maintain their constitutional rights while incarcerated: “Admittedly, 
prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate.”97  
While lawful incarceration may bring about necessary limitations of 
privileges and rights, such limitations may only be imposed for a 
legitimate penological interest.  No such interest justifies the alienation 
of a prisoner from her rights to be spared from cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. 
 The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.98  In order to 
assert an Eighth Amendment violation, “the offending conduct must be 
wanton.”99  The word wanton is not strictly defined, and its meaning in 
the Eighth Amendment context depends upon the circumstances in 
                                                 
 
92 Id. at 442. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 443. 
96 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
97 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). 
98 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  
99 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991).  
2014]                               CHILDBIRTH IN CHAINS                                        125  
 
which the alleged violation occurs.100  However, the history of the 
constitutional prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment” has been 
recounted at length in Supreme Court opinions, and sheds light on the 
primary concerns of the drafters.  
 The phrase “cruel and unusual” first appeared in the English 
Bill of Rights of 1689, and appears to have been directed against 
punishments unauthorized by statute, beyond the jurisdiction of the 
court, or disproportionate to the offense involved.101  However, it 
appears that when the American drafters adopted the phrase for 
incorporation into the United States Constitution, they were primarily 
concerned with the prohibition of tortures and other barbarous 
methods of punishment.102  
 The Supreme Court, accordingly, first applied the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibitions to cases involving challenged methods of 
execution.  However, the Court has since expanded its interpretation, 
holding that the Eighth Amendment embodies “broad and idealistic 
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”103 
“The Court early recognized that ‘a principle to be vital, must be 
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.’”104  
“Thus the Clause forbidding ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments ‘is not 
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion 
becomes enlightened by a humane justice.’”105  Thus, the Court has 
more recently established precedent that the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes treatment incompatible with “the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”106  
 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court relied on the fundamental 
principles above in establishing a constitutionally guaranteed level of 
medical care for prison inmates.107  The Court held that the 
government has an obligation to provide medical care for those whom 
it is punishing by incarceration.108  Furthermore, deliberate 
indifference by prison personnel to an inmate’s medical needs 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment contravening the Eighth 
Amendment.109  The Court explained that while incarcerated, an 
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inmate is completely dependent and at the mercy of prison authorities 
to properly handle his or her medical needs.110  In the worst cases, 
failure to do may produce conditions of physical torture and even 
impending death.111  In even the best cases, failure to do so may result 
in pain and suffering that no one can argue is justified by any 
legitimate penological purpose.112  “The infliction of such unnecessary 
suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency  . . . 
.”113  
 In even more recent cases, the Court has further extended the 
rationale of its holding in Estelle v. Gamble, holding that prison 
officials have the additional obligation to ensure humane conditions 
for inmates at all times of incarceration, and to protect prisoners in 
custody from any substantial risks of harm to their health or safety.114  
In Helling v. McKinney, for example, a prisoner brought a cause of 
action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that prison officials 
had, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of 
environmental tobacco smoke that posed an unreasonable risk of 
serious damage to his future health.115  The Court held for the prisoner, 
concluding that Eighth Amendment protection against deliberate 
indifference to prison health problems extends to conditions that 
threaten to cause health problems in the future, as well as current 
health risks.116  In Hope v. Pelzer, an inmate filed suit after he was 
handcuffed to a hitching post by prison guards.117  Hope, the inmate, 
had gotten into an argument with a prison guard after he was caught 
napping on the bus ride to a worksite.118  Hope was subsequently 
handcuffed and transported back to the prison, where he was then 
handcuffed to a hitching post for seven hours in the sun.119  The Court 
held that Hope had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment because the guards had knowingly 
subjected him to “a substantial risk of physical harm, unnecessary 
pain, unnecessary exposure to the sun, prolonged thirst and taunting, 
and a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a risk of particular 
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discomfort and humiliation.”120  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Stevens noted that, “the Eighth Amendment violation is obvious.”121 
 It is no stretch to conclude that the act of shackling a pregnant 
prison inmate, especially during labor, childbirth, or the post-partum 
recovery process, constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment as 
provided by Estelle v. Gamble.  This is especially apparent in light of 
Helling v. McKinney and Hope v. Pelzer.  By shackling a pregnant 
prison inmate, a prison official is knowingly subjecting the inmate to 
grossly inhumane conditions, a substantial risk of harm to both the 
health and safety of the inmate and her child, unnecessary pain and 
suffering, and significant humiliation and discomfort.  In the words of 
Justice Stevens in Hope v. Pelzer, the Eighth Amendment violation in 
cases involving the shackling of pregnant female inmates is obvious.   
 
B. No Reasonable Penological Interest Justifies Shackling 
Pregnant Female Inmates 
 
 Not only does the act of shackling exhibit a deliberate 
indifference to a pregnant prisoner’s medical needs in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, but also there exists no 
competing penological interest to justify such barbaric treatment.  Still, 
however, those resistant to banning the practice cite security interests, 
safety needs, and decreasing flight risks as justifications.  
 In Turner v. Safley, the Court held that prison standards, such 
as shackling, are subject to a “reasonableness” standard of review.  
The Court explained, “When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' 
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.”122  An analysis using the Court’s 
framework in Turner v. Safley invalidates the claim that shackling is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. 
 The relevant four-part test provided by the Court in Turner v. 
Safley examines “whether a prison regulation that burdens 
fundamental rights is ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological 
objectives, or whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to those 
concerns.”123  First, there must be a “valid, rational connection” 
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest 
put forward to justify it.124  Thus, a regulation cannot be sustained 
where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted 
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goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.125  
Moreover, the governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral 
one.126  
 Second, whether there are alternative means of exercising the 
right that remain open to prison inmates must be considered.127  Where 
“other avenues” remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, 
courts should be particularly conscious of the “measure of judicial 
deference owed to corrections officials ... in gauging the validity of the 
regulation.”128  
 Third, an analysis of “the impact accommodation of the 
asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and 
on the allocation of prison resources generally” is required.129  The 
Court in Turner v. Safley explained, “In the necessarily closed 
environment of the correctional institution, few changes will have no 
ramifications on the liberty of others or on the use of the prison's 
limited resources for preserving institutional order.”130  Further, 
“[w]hen accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant 
‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be 
particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections 
officials.”131  
 Finally, the fourth factor involves consideration of the 
existence of alternatives.  The Court noted that the “absence of ready 
alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison 
regulation,”132 while “the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may 
be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an 
‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.”133  However, the Court 
warned: 
 
This is not a “least restrictive alternative” test: prison 
officials do not have to set up and then shoot down 
every conceivable alternative method of 
accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint.  
But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative 
that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de 
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minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may 
consider that as evidence that the regulation does not 
satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.134 
 
 The prison policy of shackling pregnant female inmates fails 
the Turner v. Safley test.  First, there exists no “valid, rational 
connection” between the prison regulation of shackling and any 
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.  Security 
maintenance and flight risk are cited as the two principal justifications 
for shackling.  While these justifications may serve as legitimate 
governmental interests when applied to the prototypical violent male 
offenders that shackling was originally adopted to control, these 
justifications are completely illogical when applied to pregnant female 
inmates.  The majority of female inmates are non-violent offenders, 
and thus pose no security risk in the first place.  Further, it is irrational 
to conclude that a pregnant inmate, especially one in the active labor 
process or one recovering from having just given birth, poses any 
significant threat in terms of security or flight.  In the unimaginable 
case where such a pregnant inmate does attempt to escape, it seems 
far-fetched that she would be able to travel very far before being 
stopped.  As William Schultz, executive director of Amnesty 
International succinctly stated, “this is the perfect example of rule-
following at the expense of common sense. . . .  [I]t’s almost as stupid 
as shackling someone in a coma.”135  Thus, shackling cannot be 
sustained as a reasonable regulation when imposed upon pregnant 
female inmates, as the logical connection between the regulation and 
the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or 
irrational.136 
 The second part of the Turner v. Safley test, which requires 
contemplation of “whether there are alternative means of exercising 
the right that remain open to prison inmates”137 illustrates the 
unconstitutionality of shackling female prison inmates because there 
simply are no other alternative means offered to alleviate pregnant 
female inmates from giving birth while being forced to endure the 
barbaric and torturous practice of shackling.  The lack of “other 
avenues” available clearly demonstrates a gross and unjustified 
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deference toward prison officials and, consequently, the invalidity of 
such a regulation.138 
 Third, “the impact accommodation of the asserted 
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the 
allocation of prison resources generally” must be considered.139  The 
Court in Turner v. Safley explained, “In the necessarily closed 
environment of the correctional institution, few changes will have no 
ramifications on the liberty of others or on the use of the prison's 
limited resources for preserving institutional order.”140  However, the 
shackling of pregnant female inmates is, in fact, the perfect example of 
a regulation that, if abolished, will have “no ramifications on the 
liberty of others or on the use of the prison’s limited resources for 
preserving institutional order.”141  The only ramification of abolishing 
the shackling of pregnant female inmate is the positive ramification of 
allowing her to serve her sentence without being exposed to cruel, 
inhumane, and dangerous treatment. 
 Lastly, the Court’s declaration that “absence of ready 
alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation” 
must be considered.142  The Court noted that “the existence of obvious, 
easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, 
but is an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.”143  This is exactly 
the case here.  Various alternatives exist to shackling pregnant female 
inmates.  For example, states could elect to merely supervise pregnant 
female inmates rather than shackle them.  As stated previously, it is 
irrational for a state to consider a pregnant inmate a security or flight 
risk, especially if that inmate is in labor, giving birth, or recovering 
from giving birth.  Further, even if a woman has a history of violence 
(which few female inmates have), or has ever attempted to escape 
before (which few female inmates have), the likelihood that 
supervision would not completely prevent a security breach or 
immediately remedy it is nominal at best.  
 It is clear, applying the test in Turner v. Safley, that shackling 
pregnant female inmates constitutes an invalid and unconstitutional 
prison regulation, as it fails to be even remotely related to legitimate 
penological interests.144  
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VIII.    INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Although international human rights law is not binding on the 
United States courts, it does act as persuasive authority.  This is 
particularly important in the specific arena of shackling for two 
reasons.  First, there is evidence that the United States Supreme Court 
has, within the past decade, given more acknowledgment and 
consideration to international consensus, especially in consideration of 
human rights issues.145  Second, this attention is especially valuable, 
because if the United States does turn to the international arena for 
guidance on the issue of shackling, it will be met with unwavering, 
consistent outrage and criticism voiced by international committees, 
health experts, and legislatures urging the United States to 
immediately ban all shackling of pregnant inmates.  
 
A. Increasing Acknowledgment of International Law and 
Consensus 
 
 The United States Supreme Court has just recently started to 
both refer to and rely upon international human rights law.  This 
encouraging shift was first illustrated in 2003 through the Court’s 
decision in Lawrence v. Texas.146  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court 
held that a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same 
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional, 
as applied to adult males who had engaged in consensual acts of 
sodomy in the privacy of their home.147  The Court explained that the 
statute constituted a violation of the petitioners’ right to privacy, 
impinging on their exercise of liberty interests protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.148 
 This case was of particular importance for two reasons.  First, 
the Court overruled its previous holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, in 
which the Court steadfastly upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing 
consensual sodomy.149  In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court refrained 
from giving much consideration to homosexuality from a human rights 
standpoint, and firmly invalidated the issue as unrelated to any 
fundamental right.150  The Court was “quite unwilling” to confer upon 
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homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in sodomy, insisting that 
none of the rights announced in the Court’s prior cases dealing with 
family relationships, marriage, or procreation bear any resemblance to 
the asserted right to engage in sodomy.151  Further, the Court harshly 
concluded that “to claim that a right to engage in [homosexual] 
conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition’ or 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”152  
Thus, by overruling its holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court 
illustrated significant progress in its consideration and 
acknowledgement of the progression of human rights issues, and 
necessary adaptation.  
 Even more importantly, the Court’s holding in Lawrence v. 
Texas is significant due to the Court’s reference to and reliance upon 
international human rights law and opinion in its decision.  While 
outlining its justifications and considerations for overturning its 
previous ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court referred to the 
parallel holding of the European Court of Human Rights in Dudgeon v. 
United Kingdom, in which the European Court of Human Rights 
struck down a Northern Ireland law that prohibited consensual 
homosexual conduct.153  The Court explained, “To the extent Bowers 
relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted 
that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected 
elsewhere.  The European Court of Human Rights has followed not 
Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v [sic] United Kingdom.”154  
The Court continued: 
 
Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an 
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults 
to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.  The right 
the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an 
integral part of human freedom in many other countries.  
There has been no showing that in this country the 
governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice 
is somehow more legitimate or urgent.155 
 
 A second illustration of the United States Supreme Court’s 
encouraging recognition and reliance upon international consensus and 
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human rights law came in Roper v. Simmons,156 decided in 2005.  The 
Court in Roper v. Simmons held that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit execution of individuals who were under 18 
years of age at time of their capital crimes.157  Like the holding in 
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court’s holding in Roper v. Simmons is 
important for two reasons.  
 First, by holding that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment forbids the imposition of the death 
penalty upon offenders who were juveniles at the time of the crime’s 
commission, the Court abrogated its previous ruling in Stanford v. 
Kentucky, which is illustrative of progress.  In Stanford v. Kentucky, 
the Court held that imposition of capital punishment on an individual 
for a crime committed at 16 or 17 years of age did not violate evolving 
standards of decency and thus did not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.158  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Scalia declined to take international consensus into 
consideration, and focused his analysis solely on the Constitution and 
precedent of United States courts.159  Justice Brennan, however, with 
whom Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens joined, 
pointed to persuasive international law and opinion in his dissent.  
Justice Brennan insisted that although the majority seemed determined 
to root its holding in constitutional grounds, “indicators of 
contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in other 
countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis.”160  
Justice Brennan explained: 
 
Many countries, of course – over 50, including nearly 
all in Western Europe – have formally abolished the 
death penalty, or have limited its use to exceptional 
crimes such as treason.  Twenty-seven others do not in 
practice impose the penalty.  Of the nations that retain 
capital punishment, a majority – 65 – prohibit the 
execution of juveniles.  Sixty-one countries retain 
capital punishment and have no statutory provision 
exempting juveniles, though some of these nations are 
ratifiers of international treaties that do prohibit the 
execution of juveniles.  Since 1979, Amnesty 
International has recorded only eight executions of 
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offenders under 18 throughout the world, three of these 
in the United States.  The other five executions were 
carried out in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and 
Barbados.  In addition to national laws, three leading 
human rights treaties ratified or signed by the United 
States explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties.  
Within the world community, the imposition of the 
death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be 
overwhelmingly disapproved.161 
 
 Although the dissent did not have an effect on the holding of Stanford 
v. Kentucky in 1989, it most certainly grabbed some attention, and 
possibly influenced Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Roper v. 
Simmons in 2005. 
 Accordingly, the second reason that Roper v. Simmons is 
significant in that, unlike in Stanford v. Kentucky, the majority relied 
heavily upon international consensus in its holding, thus securing 
international human rights law’s credibility in the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision-making process.  In its opinion, the Court 
took notice of “the stark reality that the United States is the only 
country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the 
juvenile death penalty.”162  Justice Kennedy explained: 
 
[O]nly seven countries other than the United States 
have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and China.  Since then 
each of these countries has either abolished capital 
punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of 
the practice.  In sum, it is fair to say that the United 
States now stands alone in a world that has turned its 
face against the juvenile death penalty.163  
 
Further, the Court explained: 
 
It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming 
weight of international opinion against the juvenile 
death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding 
that the instability and emotional imbalance of young 
                                                 
 
161 Id. at 389-90 (internal citations omitted).  
162 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
163 Id. at 577 (internal citations omitted). 
2014]                               CHILDBIRTH IN CHAINS                                        135  
 
people may often be a factor in the crime.  The opinion 
of the world community, while not controlling our 
outcome, does provide respected and significant 
confirmation for our own conclusions.164 
  
The Court’s decisions and consideration in both Lawrence v. 
Texas and Roper v. Simmons are encouraging, as they illustrate the 
Supreme Court’s increasing acknowledgment of international human 
rights law and international consensus as persuasive authority.  This 
shift is especially valuable in regards to the shackling epidemic in the 
United States, because if the United States does turn to the 
international arena for guidance on the issue of shackling, it will find 
unwavering, consistent support for the abolishment of the barbaric 
practice. 
 
B. International Opposition 
 
 In addition to constituting a violation of the United States 
Constitution, the shackling of pregnant female inmates is also a clear 
violation of various international human rights laws and conventions, 
which afford broad protections to pregnant women.  Most specifically, 
the United States’ shackling of pregnant female inmates violates two 
major international treaties: the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment165 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,166 both of which 
are ratified by the United States. 
 The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, also known as CAT, was 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 
10, 1984.167  The Convention entered into force on June 26, 1987, and 
has been ratified by 151 nations, including the United States, which 
ratified the treaty in 1994.168  Thus, it is both ironic and concerning 
that the United State continues to employ the practice of shackling 
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pregnant female inmates, as CAT implicitly prohibits such action.  In 
Article I, Section I of CAT provides:  
 
“[T]orture” means any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for 
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It 
does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.169  
 
Furthermore, Article 16 of CAT provides that actions which fall short 
of torture may still constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment,170 thus providing a catch-all provision.  The United Nations 
Committee Against Torture serves as the monitoring body of CAT.171  
The Committee is a United Nations body of ten independent experts 
that meets twice per year in Geneva, Switzerland to monitor the 
implementation of CAT and review State compliance.172  
 Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, known as ICCPR, was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on December 16, 1966, and entered into force on March 23, 
1976.173  ICCPR currently has 74 signatories and 167 parties, 
including the United States, which ratified the treaty in 1992.174  
ICCPR has five core provisions, outlining individual rights to physical 
integrity, liberty and security of person, procedural fairness and rights 
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of the accused, individual liberties, and political rights.175  The United 
Nations Human Rights Committee serves as the monitoring body of 
ICCPR.176  The United Nations Human Rights Committee is a United 
Nations body of eighteen independent experts that meets 
approximately three times per year in Geneva, Switzerland or New 
York to review compliance of member states with ICCPR.177  The 
members of the Committee, who must be of high moral character and 
recognized competence in the field of human rights, are elected by the 
member states on an individual basis.178  
 Since 2000, various complaints have been submitted to both 
governing Committees, drawing attention to the United States’ 
violations of the two treaties through the practice of shackling 
pregnant female inmates.  Two reports stand out in significance.  In 
May of 2000, Amnesty International filed a complaint with the United 
Nations Committee against Torture, reporting that in the United States, 
it “remains common for restraints to be used on pregnant women 
prisoners when they are transported to and kept at the hospital, 
regardless of their security status.”179  The report led to international 
condemnation of the practice, and criticism of the United States for 
their violation of the treaty.180  The United Nations Committee Against 
Torture expressly stated, “The Committee is concerned at the 
treatment of detained women in the State party, including gender-
based humiliation and incidents of shackling women detainees during 
childbirth” as prohibited by Article 16.181  The Committee continued, 
“The State party should adopt all appropriate measures to ensure that 
women in detention are treated in conformity with international 
standards.”182  The Human Rights Committee issued concluding 
observations directed at the United States, reiterating its position that 
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the United States should immediately “prohibit the shackling of 
detained women during childbirth” in order to reach compliance with 
the treaty and international human rights laws.183 
 The United States was again on the receiving end of harsh 
criticism after another complaint was filed in 2006.  This time, the 
complaint was filed by the International Gender Organization.184  The 
United Nations Committee Against Torture was more specific in its 
address, dedicating an entire section to its concerns regarding the 
United States’ shackling of pregnant inmates during childbirth.185  The 
Committee explained, “The Committee is concerned at the treatment 
of detailed women in the State part, including gender-based 
humiliation and incidents of shackling women detainees during 
childbirth” in violation of Article 16.186  “The State part should adopt 
all appropriate measures to ensure that women in detention are treated 
in conformity with international standards.”187 
 As evidenced above, the United States is violating women’s 
rights on an international scale by shackling incarcerated pregnant 
women, and is being repeatedly called out for its barbaric actions by 
numerous international authorities and experts.  The United States 
must immediately abolish the practice in order to comply with its 
obligations under various human rights treaties. 
 
IX.  PROMISING PROGRESS 
 
 Over the past decade, human rights advocates have achieved 
significant headway in drawing attention to the issue of shackling 
pregnant female inmates and initiating policy change at the federal and 
state levels.  Amnesty International’s report in 2000 constituted the 
first of its kind, publically bringing the United States under fire for its 
barbaric, but disturbingly common practice of shackling pregnant 
female inmates.188  Amnesty International’s report essentially opened 
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the door for what has now become consistent condemnation, being the 
very first to avoid tip-toeing around the issue, demanding immediate 
resolution, and declaring the United States’ actions “a direct violation 
of international standards.”189 
 This report has led to anti-shackling laws in numerous states.  
Illinois, California, Vermont, and Rhode Island have all passed anti-
shackling legislation.  In 2000, the Illinois state legislature amended 
the state’s Unified Code of Corrections by adding an anti-shackling 
provision.190  The provision expressly states: 
 
Pregnant female committed persons.  Notwithstanding 
any other statute, directive, or administrative regulation, 
when a pregnant female committed person is brought to 
a hospital from an Illinois correctional center for the 
purpose of delivering her baby, no handcuffs, shackles, 
or restraints of any kind may be used during her 
transport to a medical facility for the purpose of 
delivering her baby.  Under no circumstances may leg 
irons or shackles or waist shackles be used on any 
pregnant female committed person who is in labor.  
Upon the pregnant female committed person's entry to 
the hospital delivery room, a correctional officer must 
be posted immediately outside the delivery room.  The 
Department must provide for adequate personnel to 
monitor the pregnant female committed person during 
her transport to and from the hospital and during her 
stay at the hospital.191  
 
 In 2005, California followed in Illinois’ footsteps by enacting 
an anti-shackling provision.  California’s provision, outlined in a five-
part provision of the Penal Code, succinctly provides, “An inmate 
known to be pregnant or in recovery after delivery shall not be 
restrained by the use of leg irons, waist chains, or handcuffs behind the 
body.”192 
 A few state legislatures have implemented shackling 
provisions, but fall short of calling for the complete abolishment of the 
practice upon pregnant female inmates.  For example, in 2012, Rhode 
Island’s legislature implemented an extensive five-part provision in its 
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Administrative Code.  The provision prohibits the use of leg or waist 
restraints on an inmate during labor and delivery by providing, “Under 
no circumstances can leg or waist restraints be used on any detainee or 
inmate during labor and delivery.”193  However, handcuffs are 
permitted as restraining mechanisms during labor and delivery, and leg 
and waist restraints are permitted both prior to labor and after the birth 
of the child if the inmate poses “(1) [a]n immediate and serious threat 
of physical harm to herself, staff or others; or (2) [a] substantial flight 
risk and cannot be reasonably contained by other means.”194 
 Progress has also been achieved in United States Circuit 
Courts.  In Shawanna Nelson’s case, Nelson v. Correctional Medical 
Services, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit made history when it became the first appellate court to finally 
hold that shackling a female inmate during the labor and delivery 
processes, in the absence of clear and individualized safety and 
security justifications, constitutes a violation of one’s “clearly 
established” Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment.195  The en banc United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit “determined that there is sufficient evidence in the 
record to permit a reasonable fact-finder to determine that Turensky's 
actions [in shackling Nelson] violated the Eighth Amendment . . . .”196  
Additionally, Juana Villegas’ case, Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of 
Nashville, continues to be litigated in the Sixth Circuit with 
encouraging progress.197  In April of 2011, a United States District 
Court granted summary judgment to Ms. Villegas, leading a jury to 
award her $200,000 in damages after a trial.198  In March of 2013, 
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
reversed the District Court’s ruling and remanded the case back for 
further proceedings due to the existence of material questions of 
fact.199  
 Despite the noted progress above, these achievements and the 
extraordinary efforts of activists and attorneys unfortunately still fail to 
keep pace with the exorbitant rate at which females are entering the 
United States’ criminal justice system, and thus the number of 
incarcerated pregnant women forced to endure shackling continues to 
grow.  
                                                 
 
193 R.I. CODE R. 17-1-19:III. 
194 Id.  
195 Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009). 
196 Id. at 531. 
197 Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013). 
198 Id. at 566. 
199 Id. at 578.  
2014]                               CHILDBIRTH IN CHAINS                                        141  
 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
 In failing to immediately implement federal legislation banning 
the shackling of pregnant female inmates, the United States is allowing 
a practice to continue that is not only dangerous, barbaric, and 
inhumane, but also constitutes a violation of the United States 
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, as well as international human 
rights laws and treaties.  No penological interests can be classified as 
legitimate justifications for the continued shackling of these female 
prisoners, especially in light of the excessive medical dangers that 
shackling imposes upon both the mother and her child.  Although 
advocates and some state legislatures have achieved encouraging 
progress, these efforts are not enough, and the United States remains 
an outlier in its cruel practices.  The United States needs to follow the 
advice and recommendations of its international allies, and abandon 
the grossly inhumane practice of shackling pregnant female inmates. 
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